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1. Introduction 
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Should share repurchase activity increase shareholder value? The empirical 
evidence, to date, for the US m町ketindicates that share buybacks increase shareholder 
value for al forms of repurchase meihods available to US corporations.III Share buyback 
programs, however, a回目lat1velynew m Japan The Commer口alCode in Japan was 
revised in 1997 allowing Japanese companies to buyback their own shares. Thus the 
Japanese experience should provide us with a umque opportunity to investigate tlie extent 
to which empirical findmgs in the US are robust to different market settings. This note 
has the modest objective of documenting the change in shareholder value due to share 
repurchase announcements in the Japanese market. Several hypotheses explaining the 
悶.tionalebehind the positive creation of shareholder wealth are proposed in the literature. 
We focus on the information signaling hypothesis suggested by Vermaelen (1981) as a 
potential rationale and find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. 
In mid January 1998, the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) 
suggested that the rules governmg叩 rporateshare buybacks be relaxed More 
specifically, the Keidanren Chairman, Mr. Takashi Imai (formerly of Nippon Steel Co刷
placed a formal request with the former Prime Minister Kuchi M1yazawa to allow firms 
to use their legal capital reserves for share buyback purposes Under this proposal 
companies could use capital su中lusif the sum of the company’s retained earnings and 
capital reserves exceeded 25%。fits equity. This would make iteasier for les profitable 
firms to undertake repurchasing activity. 
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The original Japanese Commercial Code prohibited compames in Japan to 
repurchase their shares in order to prevent managers from manipulating the system. 
However. with collapse of the Japanese“bubble”， the government permitted Japanese 
firms to repurchase shares. In October 1994, the Commercial Code was revised to allow 
compames to repurchase shares using its retained earnings so long as approval is granted 
at the shareholders meeting. Jn other words, the articles of association need not be 
changed. One drawback to this scheme was the tax code An imputed dividend from the 
sha問 buybackscheme is subject to taxation at the same rate as other income. This IS 
referred to as the deemed dividend tax 
In March 1996, the code was revised allowing Japanese companies to repurchase 
their own sh町田usingretained earnings or funds reserved for the payment of dividends. 
However, companies could not purchase more than IO% of their outstanding shares 
under this system. Two years later, in March 1998, share buybacks could be financed 
with legal capital surplus as mentioned above. A limit on the number of shares that could 
be purchased is not imposed on the legal capital surplus financing scheme. Both the 
retained earnings and legal surplus funding schemes req山田 approvalat shareholder 
meetings and at the Board level. Moreover, both financing methods would have been 
subject to the deemed dividend tax. Fortunately, the “temporary”freeze on deemed 
dividend taxes should make share buybacks more likely. 
For a company to repurchase its shares, it must revise its articles of association to 
include an article on the repurchasing of stock. This change in articles must be approved 
at shareholders meeting under Japanese Commercial Law. In changing the articles, the 
shareholders are protected in possible instances where repurchases are undertaken for the 
purpose of “greenmail，” for example. This places legal responsibility on the Directors 
Once, the articles are changed, the company must decide on the number of shares to 
repurchase and the method of repurchase Two methods used to date in Japan are the 
open market repurchase (OMR) and fixed price tender offer (FPT) 
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The open market repurchase method involves a company announcing it will 
purchase a speci日edamount (m yen) during a specific period m the open market Thus, 
co中nrationsusing this method cnuld vary the amount of shares they問purchaseover the 
specified penod and pu陀 hasethe shares at di汀eringmarket prices In contrast, in an 
FPT, the company will offer to buy a spec1日ednumber of shares at a given price within a 
given time frame. Generally, the fixed price offer is higher than the cuπent or prevailing 
market price. 
Why would firms change their articles and begin a repu四hasingplan during the 
199D's in JapanワIngeneral, one would suspect that a firm which uses its excess cash to 
repurchase its own shares would be penalized by the market. For use of cash m this 
manner signals that firms do not have pro日tableor positive net present value pr<句ectsto 
invest m However, under the signaling hypothesis, if a company announces that it will 
repurchase its own shar田 ata substantial premium over the market pC1ce, then this 
announcement serves as a signal that management believes its shares are undervalued 
relative to the market Assuming the managers assessment is correct, then the market 
should respond favorably to the (fixed price）田purchaseprogram.山 Giventhe weak 
performance of the Japanese market in the 1990’s, it is possible that some firms desired 
to signal their fundamental strength to the market m this way. 
2 Methodology and Data 
We gathered mformation on announcement dates, company names, number of 
shares repurchased，四purchaseamount, repu四basemethod, and repurchase periods from 
1996 to 1998 from the Japan Company Handbook The Bo町d’sdecision date is used as 
the event date The study is limited to companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(first and second sections) If transaction prices we回 missingfor five days or more, the 
company was deleted from the sample. This leaves us with a sample of 184 repurchase 
announcements. 
86 
A simple but standard event study methodology was used in this study. Weston et al. 
( 1997) provides an ove刊iewof event study methods used in empirical rese訂chm the 
area of co中oratefinance Abnormal問turnswe問 generatedby taking the daily return for 
each company les the daily Nikke1 mdex return In e百ect,we are assuming a uniform 
beta equal to one for al compani出 inthe sample. 
AR,,= R;, R;""・' , 
where AR;, is the abnormal return for company 1 attimeιR;, is the田turnfor company 1,
and R;,,1,, is the index return. The average abnormal return is defined as AR, = 
('£:, AR;,)/N for N印刷
CAR, = L,0_1AR，’ 
where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return. CAR IS simply the sum of the average 
abnormal returns over a specified time period around the announcement. For pu中osesof 
this paper, the event window was set from 30 trading days to +30 trading days around 
the announcement date (day zero) All findings m this study were robust to the use of 
Niはetand TOPIX indices We also used a longer window of -40 to +40 days but the 
results we田 qualitativelyStmilar to the 30 to +30 day window. 
3. Empirical Fmdings and Discussion 
We find the CAR for the entire sample is substantially negative and hence it would 
appear that the first generation of repurchase programs in Japan did not create 
sh町出olderw田Ithat least in the short run As we did not adjust the beta for each firm, 
these results could be attnbuted to the overall downward trend in the market 
When we partitioned the sample, however, the results were strikingly different. We 
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first focused on a sub-sample of repurchases under the fixed tender price method Under 
this approach firms would o打era price at a premium over the cuπ・ent market price, hence 
we would expect a positive reaction on average 1f the shares are undervalued. Given the 
market conditions rn Japan at the time, this mind set would appear plauSJb!e as 
companies reqmred avenues to signal to the market that their business was fundamentally 
sound. In our sample of 20 announcements, the 30 day CAR was 0.0259 indicating an 
inc問asein shareholder wealth (Table I). The CAR turns positive on day +I and remains 
consistently pcsitive roughly in the same range for the remaining thirty days of the event 
window. Not only is this pattern consistent with those found in the US market but 
consistent with the predictions of the signaling hypothesis. 
Table 1: C 1mulabve Abnormal Returns 
Day Fixed Price Medium Sized 
30 0.口028 -0』0002
20 -0.0062 0』004
-15 O.Dl8 0.0278 
-10 -0 0088 -0.0293 
-5 -0.023 -0.0283 
4 回0C24 -0.0277 
-3 0.日28 0.0236 
-2 0.018 0:0287 
-1 -0口2日ーO』303
0 -0 017 -0.0210 
I O.Dl5 0.0055 
2 0日75 0』010
3 o.日073 0.0059 
4 0口053 0』086
5 0口064 0.0121 
10 0.0126 0』137
15 0.0111 0.0145 
20 00154 0』185
30 0日259 0』262
C笠担竺E悶 ve
0.0028 
0.0135 
0.0001 
-0.0160 
・0.0288
0.0305 
-0.0307 
-0.0354 
・0.0389
0.0371 
0.0090 
-0 0007 
0.0021 
0.0058 
0.0059 
0口055
0 0068 
0口095
0.0283 
Fixed price『efe"10 announcemen1' for the fixed price lender o町er('"mple 'ize N=20) 
Medium 'ize refern 10叩叩叩cementfor medium 'ized日間＂ σSEcla"ificalion) undertaking 
'har℃repu悶h"'"(N=55). Capital re＂刊 e田fernto announcements fm finn' u'ing their capital 
re"rve fund' to repurcha>e 'hare' (N=44). Al abnonnal return' are generated問lativeto出e
Nikk白 indexAnnouncement i' centered at day zero. Sample coveJS日nn'lisied on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange from 1997 to late 1998. CAR i''1at凶icaly'1gnificant at the ten pe悶 ntlevel 
for al day' from +I fi町FPTand for al day' from +3 for medium sized and capital twrve. 
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We also focus on medium sized co甲orations(TSE classification) The rationale 
follows from the signaling literature. Smaller or in the case of Japan, medium sized firms, 
should exhibit stronger signaling effec臼 Againwe find evidence consistent with 
hypothesis as the CAR at day 30 is positive (Table I). Here, however, the CAR did not 
turn positive until day 3 
And finally, we created a sub sample of events where the company announced it 
would use capital児 servesto fund its田purchaseprogram (from mid 1998) Our sample 
size is 44 announcemen凶ー Interestingly,the CAR is positive after day 3 ind1catmg the 
market perceives the program as welfare improving (Table 1) 
Future research would address econometnc issues on the estimation of abnonnal 
returns and place greater structure on testing the signaling hypnthesis by runnmg cross-
section regressions of the CAR (short span) on various explanatory variables The sample 
universe would be expanded to include the large number of companies which have 
started and also completed share repurchase programs since 1998. Of particular mte問stis 
the potential link between repurchase programs and stock option programs and the 
unwinding of cross-sha目 holdings.As buyback programs become a standard tool in 
managements arsenal of financial policies, we could expect creative ways of funding 
such proposals to emerge such as the use of put wa町ants(Salomon Brothers, 1994) 
Not回
* The au1hor gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mr. F Akama. 
(I) West《mel al. (1997) provides a thorough ove刊iewof the theory and empirical evidence of 
repurchase pm grams in Chapter 18. Empirical work in the area include Dann ( 1981 ), 
Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarel (1991), Ikenberry et al. (1995), Lakonishok and 
Vcrmaelen (1996) among others. Okamura (1998) provides some preliminary insights on 
buyback programs in Japan. 
(2) Ikenberry and Verrnaelen (1996) suggest that日xedtender price share問purchaseprograms are 
identical in nature to optioos and apply option pricing methods to value these programs. 
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自社株買いが株価へ与える影響について
〈要約〉
竹：畢伸哉
本論文は「eventstudy Jによる自社株消却の情報効果の検証を行った。一定の
価格で買い戻す公開買付による自社株取得方法が株価に著しいプラスのインパ
クトを与えたことを証明した。
